ACourseinGameTheory

A Course in Game Theory，马丁 J.奥本斯，博弈论教程，英文原版。A Course in Game ThcoryMartin. L. OsborneAriel rubinsteinThe mit pressCambridge MassachusettsLondon, EnglandCopyright 1094 Massachusctts Institutc of TcchnologyAll rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by anystorage and retrieval) without permission in writing om the publisher, formationelectronic or mechanical means(including photocopying, recording, orThis book was typeset by the authors, who are greatly indebted to Donald Knuth(the creator of TEX), Leslie Lamport(the creator of IATEX ) and Eberhard Mattesthe creator of emTEX) for gene xously putting superlative software in the public esdomain. Camera-ready copy was produced by Type 2000, Mill valley, Californiaand the book was printed and bound by The Maple-Vail Book ManufacturingBiughaintol. neMartin JA course in game theory /Mart in Osborne, Ariel RubinsteinIncludes bibliographical refered indexSBN0-262-15041-7.ISBN0-26265040-1(pbk)1. Game Theory. I Rubinstein, Ariel. II. TitleHB144.O7331994658.40353dc20CIPContentsreface XI1 Introduction 11.1 Game Theory1.2 Games and Solutions 21.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium 31. 4 Rational Behavior 41.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations 51.6 Bounded Rationality 61.7 Terminology and Notation 6I Strategic Games 92 Nash Equilibrium 112. 1 Strategic G2.2 Nash Equilibrium 142.3 Examples 152.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium 192.5 Strictly Competitive Games 212.6 Bavesian Games: Strategic Games with ImperfectInformation 24Notes 29Contents3 Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium 313.1 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 313.2 Intcrprctations of Mixcd Stratcgy Nash Equilibrium 373.3 Correlated Equilibrium 443.4 Evolutionary Equilibrium 48Notes 514 Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of DominatedAcctions4.1 Rationalizability 534.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions 584.3 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions 62645 Knowledge and Equilibrium 675. 1 A Model of Knowledge 675.2 Common Knowledge 735.3 Can People agree to Disagree? 755. 4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts 765.5 The electronic Mail game 81Notes 84II Extensive Games with Perfect Information 876 Extensive Games with Perfect Information 896.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information 896.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 976.3 Two Extensions of the definition of a game 1016.4 The Interpretation of a Strategy 1036.5 Two Notable Finite horizon Games 1056.6 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies 108Notes 1147 Bargaining Games 1177.1 Bargaining and Game Theory 1177. 2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 1187.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 1214 Variations and Extensions 127Notes 131V118 Repeated Games 1331 The basic idea 1338.2 Infinitcly Repeated Games vs. Finitcly Repeated Amcs 1348.3 Infinitely Repeated Games: Definitions 1368.4 Strategics as Machines 1408.5 Trigger Strategies: Nash Folk Theorems 1438.6 Punishing for a Limited Longth of Timc: A Perfect FolkTheorem for the limit of means Criterion 1468.7 Punishing the Punisher: A Perfect Folk Theorem for theOvertaking Criterion 1498.8 Rewarding Players Who Punish: A Perfect Folk Theorem forthe Discounting Criterion 1508. 9 The Structure of Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under theDiscounting criterion 1538.10 Finitely Repeated Games 155Notes 16(Complexity Considerations in Repeated GaMes 1639.1 Introduction 1639.2 Conplexity anld the Machine Gaine 1649.3 The Structure of the Equilibria of a Machine Game 1689.4 The Case of Lexicographic Preferences 172Notes 17510 Implementation Theory 17710.1 IntroductioN 17710.2 The Implementation Problem 1780.3 Iimpleinentation ill DoInlimlanlt Strategies 18010.4 Nash Implementation 18510.5 Subgalnle Perfect EquilibriuM ImpleMentatioN 191Notes 195ContentsIll Extensive Games with ImperfectInformation 19711 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 19911.1 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 19911.2 Principles for the Equivalence of Extensive Games 20411.3 Framing Effects and the Equivalence of ExtensiveGames 20911.4 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies 21211.5 Nash Equilibrium 216Notes 21712 Sequential Equilibrium 21912.1 Strategies and Beliefs 21912.2 Sequential Equilibrium 22212.3 Games with Observable Actions: Perfect BayesianEquilibrium 23112.4 Refinements of Sequential equilibrium 24312.5 Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium 246Notes 254Iv Coalitional games 25513 The Core 25713.1 Coalitional Games with Transferable Payoff 25713.2 The Core 25813.3 Nonemptiness of the Core 26213.4 Markets with Transferable Payoff 26313.5 Coalitional games without Transferable Payoff 26813.6 Exchange Economies 26927414 Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the ShapleyValue 27714.1 Two Approaches 2714.2 The stable sets of von Neumann and morgenstern 27814.3 The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus 28114.4 The Shapley value 289Notes 29715 The Nash Solution 29915.1 Bargaining problems 29915.2 Thc Nash Solution: Definition and charactcrization 30115.3 An Axiomatic Definition 30515. 4 The Nash Solution and the Bargaining Gamc of AlternatingOffers 31015.5 An Exact Implementation of the Nash Solution 311Notes 312List of results 313References 321Index 341